Dissertation: “Immanence and Recollection in the Meno and the Phaedo”
In the Phaedo, Plato's Socrates seems to be saying that the forms are causally responsible for their instances, and he seems to be saying similar things in the Meno. In the past it was common to say that forms explain their instances, rather than causing them to be. More recently, scholars began urging us to take Socrates more literally. I side with them while insisting that causation by participation in form must be a spatiotemporal affair, rather than a mysterious relation between transcendent and sensible reality. This leads me to develop an account of forms that distinguishes between their roles as intelligibles, and as immanent causal powers, with surprising implications for Plato’s epistemology. Most notably, I argue that Plato’s admission of forms into the sensible world as causal powers casts doubt on his commitment to innate knowledge (i.e., the theory of recollection).
Published Papers
"Poetic Imitation: the Argument of Republic 10"
Apeiron 57 (1):55-81 (2024). (Published version)
The paper offers a new reading of the argument against poetry in Republic 10. I argue that Socrates’ corruption charges rely on the tripartite theory of the soul, and that metaphysical doctrines play a role only in the first charge, which demonstrates that the poets are not qualified to teach by reducing tragic poetry to mimetic skill. This accusation clears the way for two corruption charges: the strengthening of appetite, and the softening of spirit (i.e., ‘the greatest charge’). The former focuses on the dangerous association between the poets and the largest appetitive class in the city (hoi polloi), while the latter focuses on the corruption of the educated elite (hoi epieikeis).
"Herds of Featherless Bipeds: Division and Privation in Plato’s Statesman"
Archai 34 (Suppl. 1), (2024). G. Rudebusch, J. Piering, and T. Slabon (eds.). (Published version)
This paper explores privation in the Statesman, first from a methodological point of view, and then politically. I begin (§1) with the Rule of Bisection (262a–e): classes should be bifurcated by form, which apparently excludes division by positive and negative terms (e.g. human and non-human). The significance of the restriction is debated. I argue that the correct interpretation must take into account the preponderance of privative terms in the subsequent divisions of animals. According to one definition, humans are two-footed, non-interbreeding, hornless land animals; according to another, they are featherless, two-footed land animals (264d–266e). On my reading of the rule, classes should be bifurcated with reference to constitutive features of the resulting subclasses; while negative properties never satisfy this requirement, privations are in some cases partly constitutive of the target class in division. This insight allows me to offer a charitable reading of the Eleatic Stranger’s definitions of the human herd, which others have disparaged, as relevant for political theory (§2) and tightly linked with the Myth of the Ages (268e–274d) that follows these divisions (§3). In the final section, I sketch a unified outlook on the dialogue as concerned with effective political collaboration, under the supervision of a statesman who expertly integrates each member into the self-protective fabric of society (§4).
Works in Progress
A paper on the nature of properties in Plato's dialogues. (R&R)
A paper on definition and form in Plato's early dialogues. (draft available upon request)
A paper on Socrates' argument for recollection in the Phaedo. (draft available upon request)
A paper on the causal role of Plato's forms. (draft available upon request)